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Vietnam has faced a high risk of transmission of COVID-19 during the pandemic.
Despite the specific challenges that come with a low-resource country, the Vietnamese
government has provided a sustainable response, demonstrating both great capacity
and rapid decision-making tomanage the entirety of the COVID-19 outbreak with lessons
learned from the SARS and H1N1 epidemics in 2003 and 2009, respectively. A rapid
response, specific epidemiological F0–F5 tracing system, and public education are some
of the key measures that have helped Vietnam to control the outbreak. As of July 15,
2020, Vietnam has reported 373 accumulated confirmed cases and no deaths within
the last 90 consecutive days of no new infections in the community. Vietnam can now
consider declaring an end to the COVID-19 crisis on their part.
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INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of COVID-19 spread rapidly during the period of the traditional Lunar New Year
Festival in Vietnam, China, and Taiwan; the occasion saw a stream of millions of people who were
expected to visit their home countries (1). Given the high risk of virus transmission since the first
case report of COVID-19 in China on December 1, 2019 (2), and the first case outside China in
Thailand on January 13, 2020 (3), the Vietnamese government took numerous preventive strategies.
Indeed, airports and hospitals established additional stations to deploy body temperature scanning
for passengers and patients who had entered Vietnam in the last 21 days. Early detection and high
priority surveillance of infected cases as well as strict monitoring of airports, seaports, and national
borders were seriously applied. On January 30, 2020, when theWorld Health Organization declared
COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern with 7.736 confirmed cases in
China and 82 confirmed cases in 18 other countries (4), Vietnam had stopped issuing visas for
Chinese citizens and foreign travelers who visited China in the past 14 days. All Vietnamese citizens
had been urged to complete their health status declarations via Bluezone, a bluetooth-based mobile
application that helps to notify its users if they come into contact with a COVID-19 patient (5). All
passengers who entered Vietnam from affected areas must report all information, including their
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TABLE 1 | F0–F5 evaluation system for epidemiological tracing contacting people
who are related to a confirmed case of COVID-19 in Vietnam.
Level Definition and the attitutde of tracking
F0 Positive with COVID-19 (isolation and treat in the
hospital)
F1 Suspected of COVID-19 or having close contact
with F0 (should wear mask, maintain a distance to
other people for at least 2m, should go to the
hospital for isolation, inform to the Government and
F2 about their situation
F2 Having close contact with F1 (should wear mask,
maintain a distance to other people for at least 2m,
should stay at home for isolation and inform to the
Government and F3 about their situation)
F3 Having close contact with F2 (should wear mask,
should stay at home for isolation, and inform to the
Government and F4 about their situation)
F4, F5 Having close contact with F3, F4 (should wear
mask, should stay at home for isolation, and inform
to the Government)
contact details, COVID-19 symptoms, and current and previous
locations at entry ports before being sent to temporary hospitals
for 14-day self-isolation management. The field hospitals were
built from scratch and were also launched in the suburbs.
HOW THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
MANAGED THE FIRST WAVE OF THE
PANDEMIC
The Vietnamese Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
which had been developed and improved since the outbreak of
SARS in 2003 and H1N1 in 2009, cooperating with the Ministry
of Health, had promptly advised the government to achieve
effective and rapid control of various items. These included (1)
social distancing and barriers, restriction of movement, avoiding
public transport, closure of schools and public areas, prohibition
of gatherings of more than 15 people in air-tight areas, obligatory
use of face masks and hand hygiene practice, and enhanced
environmental ventilation. In addition, advice also looked at
(2) preventative measures, such as quarantining suspicious
cases, isolating confirmed cases, performing epidemiological
tracing, and contacting people who are related to a confirmed
case of COVID-19 by using the F0 to F5 evaluation system
(Table 1). Since February 14, Vietnamese citizens coming home
from abroad and foreign citizens arriving in Vietnam must be
quarantined for 14 days and tested for COVID-19. Further issues
included (3) advice on socio-economic management was also
given: adjustment of relevant health insurance policies, tax, the
workforce, and food and daily necessities; (4) mobilization of
armed forces to control the air, sea, and land borders; and
(5) social media education to fight fake news and the spread
of misinformation.
On March 19, the Vietnamese government temporarily
achieved a triumph for the first stage of this pandemic with 85
confirmed cases and no cases of death since the first Vietnamese
case of COVID-19 was acquired from China on January 23, 2020
(6, 7). Vietnam also had a period of 2 weeks that was free of
new cases before having a series of confirmed and suspected
cases from March 6 onwards after a stream of Vietnamese
people returning from overseas (8). Subsequently, Vietnam has
entered a new period characterized by susceptibility to COVID-
19 infection due to the high number of clusters in the community
and the loss of source tracing. On March 20, the Government
decided to impose a lockdown on Bach Mai hospital, which is
the biggest national healthcare center in the North of Vietnam
and which sees a high volume of outpatients, since the two
female nurses were tested positively to COVID-19 without a
detectable source. The Prime Minister was quick to implement
a lockdown level of 3 and 4 that saw the strict application of
contact investigation strategy using the F0–F5 evaluation system.
All of Bach Mai Hospital, including its 7,664 staff members, was
quarantined following positive testing results for SARS-CoV-2
in 27 employees working in catering (9). Contact tracing in the
community was carefully and quickly processed in an additional
52,239 individuals. Among them, 27,893 F1 and F2 persons
were subsequently detected and placed under quarantine using
∼30,000 RT-PCR tests. The national lockdown requested that
citizens stay at home and just go out for daily necessities, such as
food shops, pharmacies, urgent medical appointments, and work.
School and universities were closed. Despite the school closures,
education systems moved to online activities as an alternative.
Online teaching and learning platforms were encouraged and
widely used. Most businesses began shutting down except those
that were essential. Suspension of public transportation followed,
and travel between cities was extremely limited. A total of 3 week
later, the Bach Mai Hospital crisis was consequently contained
without further spread. As of July 15, 2020, our report revealed
373 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 352 patients (94.4%)
having recovered from COVID-19, and no cases of death (10).
Vietnam had 90 consecutive days of being free from new acquired
COVID-19 cases in the communities (Figure 1). At present, the
Vietnamese government remains vigilant of the infectious virus
to cope with its next wave. The AstraZeneca vaccine had been
approved to use across the country. The same tactics coupled with
a serious attitude are maintained.
KEY WEAPONS DURING A TIME OF
CRISIS: RAPID RESPONSE, A SPECIFIC
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL F0–F5 TRACING
SYSTEM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
The Vietnamese Government quickly ramped up its responses
and prepared for combat following the first case that originated
in China (7). A national declaration of an epidemic was officially
announced on February 1, 2020, while there were still only
six confirmed cases. The prompt reaction at the begining of
February remains a key point of success, as demonstrated
in other countries. In Romania, rapid implementation of
containment measures, including the declaration of a state
of emergency and swift application of 14-day self-isolation,
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FIGURE 1 | Epidemic curve of new cases of COVID-19 in Vietnam. The total confirmed cases are presented in green and the daily new cases in blue. The using data
was retrieved from the daily reports released by the World Health Organization.
coupled with the establishment of a nationwide information
campaign dramatically lessened the surge of infectious cases (11).
In the same manner, it took China 10 days to construct 45
makeshift hospitals in response to the burden of new confirmed
cases. Early reactions from the government in association
with sufficient emergency responses significantly contributed
to the reopening of Wuhan, the initial epicenter of COVID-
19, just after 76 days of strict restrictions (12). Furthermore,
aggressive prevention with epidemiological tracing using the
F0–F5 evaluation system represent an unique but effective
measure to mitigate the crisis. Regarding financial assisstance,
given the limited average budget of households for healthcare
services as well as the insufficient coverage of the insurance,
the Vietnamese government had anticipated an overwhelming
burden of medical expenditures on a large scale during the
outbreak. Since Vietnamese healthcare consumers are unable
to afford healthcare payments equal to or higher than US$90
(VND 2 million), especially in terms of uninsured, non-
married, and unemployed individuals (13), the government
offered budget support packages of US$2.6 billion in which
a sum of US$80 (VND 1.8 million) was distributed monthly
between April and June (14). Another important implication
is the consistent coordination across sectoral ministries/the
government departments in dealing with an event. Right after the
notice of suspected patients who returned to Vietnam by airlines,
the Ministry of Transport rapidly alerted the relevant agencies
about the passengers’ information and the corresponding flight
numbers so that quarantine could be implemented quickly and
efficiently. Passengers were also given instructions from airlines
regarding the current regulations on disease prevention and
control in Vietnam. In parallel, the Ministry of National Defense
took responsibility for the establishment of the quarantine areas
and transporting all relevant people from or passing through
regions hit by the epidemic and into other areas. Recognizing
the risks of over-reaching the airports’ capacities, the Ministry
of Public Security had quickly promulgated necessary regulations
to shorten the duration of immigration procedures. Side by side,
the Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs closely updated the
epidemic reports from around the world and hourly reported to
the Prime Minister any adequate and important findings.
On the other hand, the Government, with regular
announcements on daily news of the crisis and up-to-date
developments in terms of COVID-19 treatments, provided
official and exact information to the public. The introduction
of the website http://ncov.moh.gov.vn and the application of
the NCOVI and Vietnam Health apps on mobile phones (15),
which provided full information regarding preventive measures,
new cluster detection, testing data, and live consultation for any
inquiries related to the outbreak, sufficiently responded to the
demand of citizens about the reliable sources of information.
Furthermore, the dissemination of necessary information was
universally enhanced by the official press and social media.
The publication of ∼15,000 articles from 14 online newspapers
from January 9 to April 4, coupled with the hourly COVID-19
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update in the two main social media channels, Facebook (more
than 57% of the population), and the local app Zalo (with
100 million users), remarkably improved the awareness of all
citizens about the infectious disease (16). Besides, a Vietnamese
scientist had also engaged in the global research community by
publishing and sharing data related to COVID-19. High-quality
publications attracted attention from numerous readers and also
significantly contributed to the global database and knowledge
(7, 17, 18). As a consequence, all Vietnamese people felt safe,
proud, and confident in the Government. The whole country
is courageous and united in the efforts to combat COVID-19.
Therefore, maintaining a high level of consciousness and
responsibility for citizens is crucial and effective during this
critical period, as previously reported in Jordan and South Korea
(19, 20).
IS IT THE RIGHT WAY, VIETNAM?
Lessons learned from responding to the Ebola outbreaks
in Africa (2014–2016 and 2018–2020) emphasize the crucial
role of community engagement as well as rapid response
in fighting against the crisis (21). Early detection of a new
infection, comprehensive contact tracing, and strict quarantine
of confirmed cases are some of the backbone policies of success
in African countries. Vietnam, with the unique tracing system
F0–F5 classification, has also proven its effectiveness in rapidly
locating the new infected cluster and therefore maximally limit
the spread of the virus. Furthermore, Vietnamese citizens seem
in favor of adopting lockdown strategies and be in line with the
full response of the authorities. Regarding non-pharmaceutical
intervention, the implementation of compulsory quarantine,
school closure, and bans of public gatherings in New York
City during the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic reduced the
total mortality and induced greater delays in reaching peak
mortality (22). These physical and lockdown restrictions, such
as the closure of borders and cities, non-essential businesses,
and educational facilities, social distancing and barriers, and
the shift to work from home also helped to flatten the new
infection curve in Australia (23). Similarly, we also witnessed
the rapid application of social distancing and barriers as well
as epidemiologically preventive measures in Vietnam since the
first day of the outbreak. The current situation of a consecutive
3 months without a new community infection might be the best
answer for the aforementioned question.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the pandemic, the strong public support
for the response measures and a strong culture of surveillance
were key points in the struggle for victory. Using strict
and cross-sectoral control measures combined with social and
economic support measures, the Vietnamese government gained
the support of all Vietnamese citizens during the first wave of
the pandemic. Various factors were involved: the evacuation
flight to rescue 30 Vietnamese citizens in Wuhan, China; the
free treatment and laboratory investigation of all confirmed
and suspected COVID-19 cases; the warm attitude of hospital
staff, high quality of surveillance, and appropriate daily regimen
for quarantined people at temporary medical camps; and the
stabilization of food and daily necessities. These all contributed
to building the citizens’ belief in the government. Following the
epidemics of SARS in 2003 and H1N1 in 2009, coupled with
strong support from the United States Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (US CDC) and the WHO, the Vietnamese
government have provided a sustainable response and executed
a rapid response to manage the entirety of the COVID-19
outbreak. A serious control policies balancing with humanity in a
well-organized and well-trained teams had responded adequately
to the inquiries of Vietnam during this time. Vietnam can now
consider declaring an end to the COVID-19 crisis.
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